Hans-Herbert Kögler's Critique of the Moral Abstractions in Geopolitical Accounts of the Russo-Ukrainian War
Philosopher Hans-Herbert Kögler has recently published an essay that explores the moral reasons for supporting Ukraine as an attacked country and also critiques the moral abstractions of geopolitical accounts of the war. Although he does not refer to American political scientist John Mearsheimer explicitly, Kögler uncovers a related problematic move that certain realists often make—a move which applies to structural realists like Mearsheimer. For example, the structural realist often argues for an immediate end to the war and calls for the “great powers”—especially, the United States—to press Ukraine to negotiate peace even if it means ceding its occupied territory to Russia. Such calls for peace at all costs, whether from realists like Mearsheimer or others who oppose arming Ukraine so that they can defend themselves from Russian drones, ballistic missiles, and relentless attacks on civilian infrastructure—are themselves morally and ethically problematic.[1] As Kögler explains,
The ultimately immoral core of this demand, which radically negates the intuitive call for support for self-defense and the preservation of a self-determined way of life, is concealed by its orientation towards peace, which presents itself as [a] normatively justified and even morally superior stance in contrast to the existing warfare (and loss of life). The legitimacy to ignore the moral reality of war, however, in a situation of an attacked people which calls for support, is as such precarious and ultimately unjustifiable.[2]
Mearsheimer regularly fails to substantively address both Putin’s authoritarianism at home and the brutality of Russia’s military in the present war. When pressed to respond to such issues, structural realists like Mearsheimer (and others) who oppose the war often resort to additional strategies, of which Kögler identifies three. The first involves a “normative equivalence of the confrontationally encountering systems. Here, especially the United States and NATO are considered equally or even more so ‘imperialistic’ and guilty of aggression, such that a normative attack on the ‘aggressor’ seems misguided.” The second is to assert that the attacking “great power”—in this case, Russia—cannot or is highly unlikely to be defeated militarily, especially since it is a nuclear power. The third is to call into question the “political-ethical worthiness of the attacked party”—i.e., in the present context, the claim that Ukraine is too corrupt or full of dangerous ultra-nationalists.[3] Mearsheimer is especially fond of the first strategy, which is not to say that past US military aggression, brutality, and war crimes should not be criticized or ethically condemned—they should, but red herrings and whatabout-isms should not distract us from our moral, ethical, and solidaristic obligations to support Ukraine against a brutal, neo-imperial aggressor.
Along similar lines, in his article, “The Left Case Against the ‘Restraint’ Policy on Ukraine,” Cirincione highlights some of the flaws of those on the left who argue that the United States must pressure Ukraine to a negotiated settlement with Russia.[4] As Cirincione explains, certain left critics of U.S. military support for Ukraine “misidentify the main threat. They focus on the past rather than the future. They fail to see the rising danger from an increasingly fascist Russia under Putin and the consequences for global peace should he succeed in redrawing the map of Europe by force. It is capitulation in a diplomatic cloak.”[5] One can affirm critics from the left who desire to avoid future calamitous U.S. wars; however, to point to our past military debacles and failures as reasons for opposing the U.S. providing military weapons for Ukraine in the present situation—namely, to stop Russia’s neo-imperialist war of aggression—is not only an uncompelling argument, especially for a position that has traditionally stood against imperial and colonial violence, but it also is ethically questionable in light of the genocide and ecocide that Russia is committing in Ukraine. Yuliya Yurchenko is likewise critical of calls for peace, whether from leftist, pacificist, or geopolitical realists like Mearsheimer. “Peace at any cost is not just a phoney peace—for Ukrainians it means sanctioning genocide of them in occupied territories, erasure of their collective identity and the diversity of their ‘we-understanding’ by Russia’s annihilation by assimilation.”[6] Yurchenko points to an additional problem that surfaces in certain anti-war left positions as well as in Mearsheimer’s account—they “somehow manage to simultaneously recognize Russia’s right to ‘defend its interests’ while denying the right of Ukrainians to defend their very lives or assert their national self-determination.”[7] This tension is present in Mearsheimer’s structural realism when he denies Ukraine’s agency and uncritically accepts that Ukraine is simply part of Russia’s legitimate “sphere of influence” and intimates that Russia’s aims vis-à-vis Ukraine should be adhered to rather than Ukraine’s stated aims regarding its political path and right to self-determination.[8]
Notes
[1] It is also worth mentioning that Mearsheimer often states in his writings that the war in Ukraine could easily escalate to a nuclear war. While this possibility cannot be dismissed nor should it be taken lightly and especially not by all state parties involved, it also cannot be used by Russia as nuclear blackmail so that it can unjustly invade Ukraine, commit war crimes and atrocities, and illegally annex its territories. Mearsheimer consistently emphasizes that because of the possibility of nuclear war, the US should press Ukraine to seek a diplomatic solution to the war, which, as Mearsheimer himself admits, would mean that Ukraine would lose part of its territory, most likely Crimea. What Mearsheimer does not acknowledge is that any Russian occupied Ukrainian territory, especially a permanently occupied Crimea, would result in economic problems for Ukraine because Russia will be able to interfere with shipping from Ukrainian ports and block its exports. Additionally, the likelihood of future attacks or another war increase—after all Crimea served as a staging group for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Pressing Ukraine to hand over Crimea to the Russians will not, as Ukrainians know, produce lasting peace or prosperity for Ukraine; instead, it gives Russia time to recover, regroup, and prepare for a new attack. For a military perspective of why Ukraine must retake Crimea, see Ben Hodges, “Ukraine Should—and Properly Supported Can—Seize Crimea, argues Ben Hodges,” The Economist, January 29, 2023; https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/01/29/ukraine-should-and-properly-supported-can-seize-crimea-argues-ben-hodges. For a helpful overview of arguments for retaking Crimea and a brief understanding of the complex history of Crimea, see Casey Michel, “Here’s How Ukraine Could Retake Crimea,” Politico February 22, 2023; https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/02/22/ukraine-crimea-russia-putin-red-line-00083857.
[2] Hans-Herbert Kögler, “Democracy or Dictatorship,” The Moral Call to Defend Ukraine.” European Journal of Social Theory (March 27, 2023), 7; https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310231158.
[3] Kögler, “Democracy or Dictatorship,” 7.
[4] Joe Cirincione, “The Left Case Against the ‘Restraint’ Policy on Ukraine.” Persuasion March 13, 2023. For an argument in favor of the United States pressuring Ukraine to a negotiated settlement, see, George Beebe, “Laying the Foundations for a Settlement in Ukraine,” Responsible Statecraft January 13, 2023; https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/01/13/laying-the-foundations-for-a-settlement-in-ukraine/.
[5] Cirincione, “The Left Case Against the ‘Restraint’ Policy on Ukraine.”
[6] Yulia Yurchenko, “Democratic Socialism or Barbarism: A Reply to Hans-Herbert Kögler,” European Journal of Social Theory (May 17, 2023 published online); https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310231172721.
[7] Yurchenko, “Democratic Socialism or Barbarism.”
[8] For example, Mearsheimer states: “Even though Russian leaders made it perfectly clear that bringing Ukraine into NATO would be crossing ‘the brightest of red lines,’ the United States refused to accommodate Russia’s deepest security concerns and instead moved relentlessly to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border” (Mearsheimer, “The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War?”) Where is Ukrainian agency in Mearsheimer’s statement?